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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, Elray Rash purchased a Kenworth tractor truck for $73,700 that he
intended to use with his spouse, Jean Rash, in a contract freight-hauling business.'
After several years of payment on the truck, the Rashes found themselves unable
to stay afloat financially and filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy.2 Under their
bankruptcy plan, the Rashes wanted to retain the truck in order to keep income
flowing to them from their business.3  However, Associates Commercial
Corporation (ACC), the creditor who owned the lien on the truck, had other plans
for the truck.4 ACC wanted to sell the truck immediately and not be a part of the
Rash's bankruptcy.5 Under the Bankruptcy Code, the Rashes were permitted to
keep the truck, provided they pay to ACC the current value of the truck over the
time length of the bankruptcy plan.6 This is commonly referred to as a debtor's
"cram down" power where a debtor retains and pays the current value for
collateralized property in a bankruptcy plan over the objection of the secured
creditor.7
The issue before the Fifth Circuit in Rash was what standard of valuation
should be used to determine the value which the Rashes would pay to ACC over
the length of the bankruptcy plan.8 Until the Supreme Court decided Associates
Commercial Corp. v. Rash,9 the circuits had been divided over a replacement value
1. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1882 (1997).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 1883.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 1882 n.1, 1883 (quoting 11 U.S.C. 1325(a)(5)(B) (1994)).
7. See id. at 882-83. See generally Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Valuation in
Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1061 (1985) (providing a comprehensive review of issues in valuation
contests).
8. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d 1036,1038 (5th Cir. 1996)(en
banc), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
9. 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
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standard,' ° a foreclosure value standard," and a midpoint value standard. 2 The
Supreme Court followed the dissent of the Fifth Circuit in In re Rash3 and other
courts 4 by adopting the replacement value standard. 5
A. Reasons for Litigating Value
In bankruptcy reorganization hearings the valuation of secured collateral is a
highly debated issue between the debtor and the secured creditor because the debtor
retains and uses the secured property during the reorganization over the objection
of the secured creditor. 6 Generally, secured creditors prefer to foreclose on their
collateral and immediately put their assets to a productive and safe use.' Litigation
over valuation is fostered by the ambiguous language of the Bankruptcy Code
regarding valuation, section 506(a)." In pertinent part, section 506(a) states:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has
an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured
claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in
such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be,
and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or
the amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such
value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the
proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing
on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest.'9
10. See Taffi v. United States (In re Taffi), 96 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997). The Court labeled their standard "replacement value" standard,
however, they also gave that label the Court's own definition. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1884 n.2. The
replacement value standard is also associated with what others call "retail value." See In re Rash, 149
B.R. 430,432 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993) ("[R]etail value reflects actual replacement cost to a debtor.").
11. See In re Rash, 90 F.3d at 1060. "Foreclosure value" is similar to "wholesale value." See In
re Rash, 149 B.R. at 431-32.
12. See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105 F.3d 55,62 (2d Cir.
1997) (holding that courts have discretion to allocate value at the midpoint between replacement value
and foreclosure value); In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 316 (7th Cir. 1996) (same).
13. 90 F.3d at 1061-75 (Smith, C.J., dissenting).
14. For cases adopting a variation on the replacement value standard see, e.g., In re Taffi, 96 F.3d
at 1192-93; Metrobank v. Trimble (In re Trimble), 50 F.3d 530,531-32 (8th Cir. 1995); Winthrop Old
Farm Nurseries, Inc. v. New Bedford Inst. for Sav. (In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc.), 50 F.3d
72,74-76 (1 st Cir. 1995); Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Pees (In re McClurkin), 31 F.3d 401,406 (6th Cir.
1994); and Coker v. Sovran Equity Mortgage Corp. (In re Coker), 973 F.2d 258, 260 (4th Cir. 1992).
15. SeeRash, 117S. Ct. at 1882.
16. See id. at 1882-83.
17. See id. at 1885.
18. See In re Rash, 90 F.3d at 1043 ("The first sentence [of section 506(a)] clearly envisions a
layered analysis"); In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1996). "The briefs and arguments of the
parties are full of false starts. Both sides appeal to the 'plain meaning' of section 506(a) - a bad sign."
Id. Out of necessity, Chief Judge Posner looked to section 506(a) to try to determine the "plain
meaning," but found that "[w]e get little help from the statute." See id at 314.
19. I1 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
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The valuation standard has been interpreted differently by the circuit courts
because the statutory language does not specify a standard of valuation that should
be used.1° Congress designed section 506(a) broadly enough to encompass the
different duties it has in the Bankruptcy Code.2' Due to the statute's broad
language,22 many different theories and labels of valuation are bandied about in
court, such as those confronted in Rash.23 Other theories and labels addressed out
of court include wholesale value, retail value, orderly liquidation value, replace-
ment value, foreclosure or liquidation value, and going concern value or enterprise
value.' Section 506(a) allows courts to make case-by-case determinations of a
creditor's secured interest in the property based on "the type of bankruptcy case,
the type of property, and the proposed disposition of the collateral," without the
help of a valuation standard provided to them by the code.2' The differing
interpretations of section 506(a) prompted the Supreme Court to accept Rash to
resolve the issue for the lower courts.26
Where the law is uncertain, litigation over the amount a debtor has to pay a
creditor in bankruptcy for property retained by a debtor is likely to occur. Many
20. See In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d at 314 ("Wholesale price is one simple rule; retail price another;
the midpoint of the two prices is a third. None is enacted or excluded by the statute [section 506(a)].
We must decide which is best.").
21. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5854; see also
John J. Rapisardi, Valuing Collateral for Cram downs: Circuits Adopt Varying Approaches, N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 28, 1997, at 1, 4.
22. See NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE BANKRUPTCY REvIEW
COMMISSION, § 1.5.2, at 24445 (1997) [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION].
23. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
24. See Our Two Cents: Stay Litigation After Rash, 4 (last modified Mar. 16, 1998)
<http://www.stinson.inter.net/2cents/rash.htm>.
[r]eplacement cost (the current cost of a similar item); fair market value (what a willing buyer
would pay for a like item sold by a willing seller); liquidation value (the estimated amount that
could be realized from a forced sale of the property at a public auction after proper
advertising); orderly liquidation value (the amount that could be realized from a forced sale
of the property in tact with all related equipment not necessarily at an auction); retail value (the
price for which an item is sold at retail); wholesale value (the price for which an item is sold
at wholesale); and going concern or enterprise value (the value of an enterprise as a going
concern, taking into account goodwill).
Id.
25. See BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION supra note 22, at 244-45 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 356
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6312). "'Value' does not necessarily contemplate forced
sale or liquidation value of collateral; nor does it always imply a full going concern value. Courts will
have to determine value on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the facts of each case and the
competing interest in the case." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 356, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
6312.
26. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1789, 1884 (1997).
times the collateral is no more than a small truck or other smaller value item.27 The
difference in values asserted in Rash was at most $9,125.28 That small difference
could have been enough to force the Rashes into Chapter 7 bankruptcy because
Chapter 13 bankruptcy law permits the reorganization plan to spread out any
payments to secured creditors for only a limited amount of time.29 The amount
could have increased the Rashes' monthly payments to ACC to a level likely
unsustainable under their plan.3" Thus, parties want the law to be crystal clear to
avoid the often expensive litigation of value eating up the difference in valuations
offered.3
Another reason why a secured creditor would desire to have a higher value is
to avoid the harsh results of United Savings Ass 'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Associates., Ltd.32 The Supreme Court held in Timbers that a secured creditor can
only receive interest payments in a reorganization bankruptcy when they are over
secured.33 Even then a secured creditor will get interest payments only up to the
value of the collateral. Thus, the higher the value, the more interest a secured
creditor can receive in the period before the confirmation of the bankruptcy plan.34
Therefore, a creditor will want to argue for the highest value possible in order to
get interest payments pre-confirmation and also to declare themselves eligible post-
confirmation for adequate protection in bankruptcy.35
B. Summary of Decision
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, rejected a foreclosure value
standard in favor of a replacement value standard. 36 The Court found that the Fifth
Circuit erred when it interpreted section 506(a) because the language, while not
perfectly precise, pointed to a different valuation treatment when the property is
27. See In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1996).
28. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1883.
29. See I I U.S.C. § 1322(d) (1994) ("The plan may not provide for payments over a period that
is longer than three years, unless the court, for cause, approves a longer period, but the court may not
approve a period that is longer than five years.").
30. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1883. The Rashes proposed to pay ACC $28,500 over 58 months at
a monthly payment of $607.79. See id. Had the secured amount been established as $41,171 as ACC
desired, the Rashes' payments to ACC would have been at least $875 per month under the same terms.
See id. A difference of nearly $275 per month in a Chapter 13 individual bankruptcy could easily be
a deciding factor as to whether a reorganization will be successful or not. See Associates Commercial
Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d 1036, 1055 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
31. See In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d at 314.
32. 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
33. See id. at 372. "Over secured" describes the situation where the amount of a creditor's loan
secured by property is less than the current value of the securing property. See id. Thus, the debtor has
equity in the secured property that can be used to pay the secured creditor interest during the pre-
confirmation grace period in which the reorganization plan has not yet been filed. See id.
34. See supra note 24, at 4.
35. See id.
36. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1789, 1882 (1997).
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retained by the debtor than when the property is returned to the creditor.37 The
phrase from section 506(a) stated that "[s]uch value shall be determined in light of
the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such
property" led the Court to find that the value of the collateral in question was to be
determined from its value in the hands of the debtor in its use as a cash stream
instrument.38 The Court defined replacement value as "the price a willing buyer in
the debtor's trade, business, or situation would pay to obtain like property from a
willing seller."39 Thus, the value to the debtors would be the total present value of
the collateral if the debtors were to have to replace the truck.40
This note is concerned with presenting the problem the Rash Court faced, the
administration problems that lower courts may face as a result, and the practical
problems litigants may now face. A brief review of the case history leading up to
the decision will demonstrate the struggle that was before the lower courts
regarding property valuations in bankruptcy under section 506(a). This history
includes an examination of the three standards that conflicted the lower courts in
cram down valuation of property as well as legislative materials helpful to the
courts in making that determination.
Once the historical context is in place, the facts and law that the Court applied
to them form the fiext part of this note. Justice Ginsburg's opinion tackled each
differing circuit standard in turn. An analysis of her reasoning and assumptions of
law and interpretation of code are very important to the standard to which the Court
adhered. A review of Justice Stevens' sole dissent is to be taken up after the
majority.
11. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Circuit Courts' Differing Standards
Before the Supreme Court decided Rash, the circuits were divided as to how
secured property should be valued in a cram down situation.4 The value given to
secured property often determines whether the reorganization plan under a chapter
11 or chapter 13 bankruptcy will succeed.
37. See id. at 1884.
38. See id. at 1885 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)).
39. Id. at 1884.
40. See id. at 1886.
41. See id. at 1882.
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1. Replacement Value Standard
The First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits each adopted a standard
based on the retail or replacement value of property.42 In In re Trimble, the Eighth
Circuit held that retail value was the proper valuation standard.43 The court
reasoned that, in order to give the language of section 506(a) full effect, the
necessary standard must reflect the debtor's proposed disposition or use of the
collateral.'
The Rash Court cited In re Taffi favorably as to its holding that a fair market
value is the real estate equivalent of replacement value.45 In re Taffi was a Ninth
Circuit decision involving real property in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.' The Taffi
court held that fair market value was the correct valuation standard from which
hypothetical costs of sale should not be deducted.47
After the Fifth Circuit decided Rash the first time, both the First and Eighth
Circuits quoted the decision with approval.48 However, the subsequent Rash en
banc ruling turned against these two courts and the initial Fifth Circuit ruling.49
The first Fifth Circuit decision and the dissent in the subsequent one focused on the
second sentence of section 506(a), finding that "when a debtor intends to continue
use of creditor's collateral, the debtors are acknowledging the value of the
collateral to be greater than if liquidated," thus justifying a different and higher
valuation standard.5" The dissent further argued that a creditor's interest is more
than a lien with a right to foreclose, but that the value of the creditor's lien is not
based solely on the right to foreclose, but on the right to receive payments secured
by the collateral.5 "The value of the creditor's lien is derived from the stream of
payments that the lien secures, rather than the right to foreclose, since no
42. For cases adopting a variation on the replacement value standard, see Taffi v. United States
(In re Taffi), 96 F.3d 1190, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997); Metrobank
v. Trimble (In re Trimble), 50 F.3d 530,531-32 (8th Cir. 1995); Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc. v.
New Bedford Inst. for Sav. (In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc.), 50 F.3d 72, 74-76 (lst Cir.
1995); Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Pees (In re McClurkin), 31 F.3d 401,406 (6th Cir. 1994); and Coker
v. Sovran Equity Mortgage Corp. (In re Coker), 973 F.2d 258, 260 (4th Cir. 1992).
43. See In re Trimble, 50 F.3d at 531-32.
44. See id. at 531.
45. SeeRash, 117S. Ct. at 1884, n.2.
46. See In re Taffi, 96 F.3d at 1191.
47. See id. at 1192.
48. See In re Trimble, 50 F.3d at 531-32; Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc. v. New Bedford Inst.
for Sav. (In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc.), 50 F.3d 72, 74-76 (1st Cir. 1995).
49. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d 1036,1061(5th Cir. 1996)(en
banc), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
50. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 31 F.3d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 1994)
(quoting In re Penz, 102 B.R. 826, 828 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989)), rev'd en banc, 90 F.3d 1036 (5th
Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
51. See In re Rash, 90 F.3d at 1061-62 (Smith, C.J., dissenting).
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liquidation of the collateral is contemplated. 5
2
2. Foreclosure Value Standard
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held in In re Rash that the foreclosure value
was the proper valuation standard in a Chapter 13 cram down situation.5 3 The
appeal of this case was before the Supreme Court, and its facts and holdings are
discussed infra.54
3. Mid-Point Standard
In re Hoskins5 and General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re
Valenti),56 two cases recently decided by the Second and Seventh Circuits
respectively, opted for a standard that splits the difference between the high value
of retail and the low value of foreclosure.
In re Hoskins involved a debtor in chapter 13 bankruptcy where the court was
to determine the value of a car the debtor had retained.58 The debtor demanded a
foreclosure value of the car while the bank claimed the retail value. 9 The court
held that in chapter 13 bankruptcy cases the valuation standard for assets retained
for the production of income is the average of the retail value and the foreclosure
value.6" The court reasoned that a midpoint value standard benefitted both parties
in the situation and avoided bestowing a windfall to either side.6' The court stated
that even if the parties found themselves outside of bankruptcy, the bank would
likely never take anything less than the wholesale value of the car from the debtor
either by stretching out the loan or in forgiveness of debt because that is what the
bank could realize at a foreclosure. 62 The Hoskins court also found that the debtor
would not likely agree to refinance the loan at any amount higher than retail value
because the car would not be worth the amount owed. 63 Thus, the court used the
midpoint between the two positions, the point at which, if the parties were to spend
52. In re Green, 151 B.R. 501, 504 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993).
53. See In re Rash, 90 F. 3d at 1060-61.
54. See infra Parts IU.a.-Lll.b.
55. 102 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 1996).
56. 105 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1997).
57. In re Valenti, 105 F.3d at 62-63; In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d at 316.
58. See In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d at 313.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 316.
61. See id. at 315-316.
62. See id.
63. See id.
the time and money to negotiate, they would find themselves.' The court thereby
formed what it found to be an equitable, inexpensive, and pragmatic solution to the
problem by creating a court-mandated median between the retail and wholesale
values.65
The Second Circuit followed in In re Valenti by holding that, in chapter 13
bankruptcy cases involving retention of a vehicle by the debtor, the valuation is
determined by the midpoint between the retail and wholesale values.66 The Valenti
court found it important that the midpoint used by the lower court reflected the dual
considerations found in section 506(a) which include the following: "(1) the
purpose of the valuation, and (2) the proposed disposition and use of the collat-
eral. 67
I. FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE CASE
Rash began when husband and wife, Elray and Jean Rash, filed jointly for
Chapter 13 bankruptcy in 1992.68 In 1989, the Rashes purchased a Kenworth
tractor truck Elray used in his freight-hauling business which provided most of the
family's income.69 Associates Commercial Corporation (ACC) held the purchase
contract and lien on the truck.7 ° In their petition for bankruptcy, the Rashes
claimed the value of the truck to be $28,500, the wholesale value of the truck.7"
ACC, in a motion for relief from the automatic stay imposed by the Bankruptcy
Code72 and a motion for proof of claim as to the value of the truck, argued that the
retail value of the truck was the amount of its claim against the Rashes:
$41,171.01." Thus, had the bankruptcy court agreed with the Rashes' value, the
total cram down amount considered unsecured in the reorganization plan by the
Rashes would be $12,671.01. 7' However, after a valuation hearing, the court
determined, upon evaluating expert witnesses by both sides, that the value of the
truck was $31,875. The court arrived at that amount by using the retail blue book
64. Seeid. at316.
65. See id.
66. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105 F.3d 55, 62 (2d Cir.
1997).
67. See id.
68. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1882 (1997).
69. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d 1036, 1038-39 (5th Cir.
1996)(en banc), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
70. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1882.
71. Seeid. at 1883.
72. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994).
73. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1882.
74. See id. at 1882-83. The Rashes did not dispute that the amount of ACC's claim was
$41,171.01. See id. Instead they argued that only $28,500 should be considered secured because that
was the alleged value of the truck at the time of bankruptcy. See id. Therefore, the amount in dispute
was $12,671.01, the amount that the Rashes would owe ACC under the plan as unsecured and the
amount as to which ACC would join other unsecured creditors under the plan (and face only receiving
a fraction of that amount as the likely result). See In re Rash, 90 F.3d at 1055 n.24.
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value of $42,500 less twenty five percent, the percent the Rashes' expert testified
was necessary to make a profit on the truck due to reconditioning expenses and
sales commissions, making the potential unsecured amount of ACC's claim
$9,296.01."
The bankruptcy court found in favor of a foreclosure value established at the
valuation hearing.76 The district court upheld the finding, but the Fifth Circuit
reversed the lower courts by holding that a replacement value standard was the
proper measurement.77 The Court of Appeals then granted a rehearing en banc to
reevaluate the previous decision.78 En banc, the court reversed itself by holding the
replacement value standard was incorrect and affirmed the district and bankruptcy
courts' adoption of a foreclosure valuation standard.7 9
The Fifth Circuit, en banc, held that foreclosure value was the proper valuation
standard in a Chapter 13 cram down situation.8" The court focused their attention
on state law governing a foreclosure of collateral outside of bankruptcy, on section
506(a) in the valuation inside of bankruptcy, on an economic analysis of the
situation, and on legislative history.81
The Uniform Commercial Code as applied in Texas, the local jurisdiction in
question, allows two remedies for a secured creditor in the disposition of secured
collateral which include the following: (1) sell the property in a "commercially
reasonable" manner and apply all proceeds towards the debt, that is, sell it at a
liquidation sale, or (2) retain the property in full satisfaction of the debt.82 The
panel explained that ACC would have more of their debt secured under a
replacement value standard than it would if the truck were valued under the
applicable state law.83 The court reasoned that section 506(a) must be complied
with, and yet, state law in conflict with that statute must be followed except to the
extent that the statute through "clear[] textual guidance" required departure from
75. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1883.
76. See In re Rash, 149 B.R. 430, 433 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993), rev'd, 90 F.3d 1036 (5th Cir.
1996) (en banc), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997). The bankruptcy court labeled the standard a "wholesale
value standard." See id. However, it is roughly equivalent to the Court's definition of "foreclosure
value." See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1883 (referring to the bankruptcy court's standard as foreclosure value).
77. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 31 F.3d 325,328, 331 (5th Cir. 1994),
modified, 62 F.3d 685 (5th Cir. 1995), reh'g granted, 68 F.3d 113 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
78. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 68 F.3d 113, 114 (5th Cir. 1995) (en
banc).
79. See In re Rash, 90 F.3d at 1060-61.
80. See id. at 1060.
81. See id. at 1040-60.
82. See id. at 1041-42 (citing Tanenbaum v. Economics Lab., Inc., 628 S.W.2d 769,771-72 (Tex.
1982)).
83. See id. at 1042.
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state law.84 Therefore, because state law required a foreclosure standard of
valuation by requiring liquidation, the court found that an interpretation of section
506(a) should also be required to adhere to that standard.85
The panel then found that the first sentence of section 506(a) supported a
foreclosure value determination because it was intended to point to "the value of
the collateral to the creditor. 8 6 Where a creditor only has a lien on property, thus
giving the creditor, inter alia, the right to foreclose and retrieve his money, there is
no reason that the value should be any more than what the creditor would receive
at foreclosure.87 The panel explained that this reading of the statute neither
compelled departure from state law nor compelled a replacement value standard. 88
The panel then looked at the second sentence of section 506(a).89 The court
noted that section 506(a) merely required that valuation be made "in light of' two
main points, to wit, the following: (1) "the purpose of the valuation," and (2) the
"disposition or use" of the property.' Section 1325(a)(5) determines the purpose
of the valuation sub judice where a debtor has two choices as to a creditor such as
ACC who does not accept a reorganization plan or the planned retention of secured
property.9 First, a debtor may surrender the secured property to the creditor.92
Second, the debtor may keep the property and pay the creditor its present value
over the length of the plan.9 3 The court interpreted section 1325(a)(5)(B) and (C)
in conjunction to mean that the secured creditor should get the same amount
whether the debtor chooses to surrender or to keep the property.94 Thus, the court
reasoned that because section 506(a) deferred to "the purpose of the valuation"
which was regulated by section 1325(a)(5), there should be no difference to a
debtor and secured creditor between choosing to surrender or keep property under
that section.95
84. See id. (quoting BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 543 (1994).
85. See id.
86. See id. at 1043-44 (citing In re Raylin Dev. Co., 110 B.R. 259, 261 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989);
see also David Gray Carlson, Car Wars: Valuation Standards in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Cases, 13
BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 31-40 (1996) (discussing the first sentence of section 506(a) and its application).
87. See In re Rash, 90 F.3d at 1040.
88. See id. at 1044-45.
89. See id. at 1045.
90. See id. at 1046 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)).
91. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) (1994); In re Rash, 90 F.3d at 1045-46.
92. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C).
93. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B). Section 1325(a)(5)(B) and (C) are as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if... (5) with respect
to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan... (B)(i) the plan provides that the
holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim; and (ii) the value, as of the effective
date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not
less than the allowed amount of such claim; or (C) the debtor surrenders the property securing
such claim to such holder ....
Id.
94. See In re Rash, 90 F.3d at 1046-47.
95. See id. at 1046-47.
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The Fifth Circuit further found that the disposition or use "language [of section
506(a)] does not patently lead to the conclusion that, where the debtor proposes to
retain and use the collateral, the value of the collateral is equal to what it would
cost the debtor to replace it."96 The court reasoned that the language in section
506(a) was not sufficiently direct to compel reversal of both state law and the first
parts of section 506(a) that pointed toward a foreclosure standard.97 Thus, the
panel decided that a bankruptcy court must take into consideration the disposition
or use, but that in most cases disposition or use would not be determinative as to
the standard of valuation that would apply.9"
The Fifth Circuit also looked at the legislative history surrounding the
enactment of section 506(a) and concluded that the history supported a liquidation
value in the context of a cram down.99 The court reasoned that the legislative
history showed that Congress left the valuation of collateral flexible because
section 506(a) is applied under the Bankruptcy Code in so many different contexts
making flexibility essential to a workable utility code section such as section 506. '0
Finally, the panel rejected any arguments that the replacement value was the
fairest or that a foreclosure value standard would give debtors a windfall at the
expense of the creditors. °  The court first reasoned that a replacement value
standard would give the secured creditor a greater secured interest in the value of
the property in the possession of the debtor than it would if the creditor were to sell
the vehicle. 2 Were the debtor to purchase a substantially similar truck, the
hypothetical cost of that truck would include "services provided by a dealer, such
as inventory storage, reconditioning, marketing, and warranties of quality."' °3 This
hypothetical cost was not represented in the truck in the debtor's possession.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 1048-50.
98. See id. at 1050-51; see also Isaac M. Pachulski, The Cram Down and Valuation Under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 N.C. L. REv. 925, 939 (1980) ("It is incongruous to value a
business that is being reorganized on the basis of the price its assets ,could fetch on a piecemeal
liquidation when the entire theory of the reorganization is that the debtor is being preserved as a going
concern."). But see The Valuation Debate, AM. BANKR. INST. J., 1, 41 (Nov. 1996) (complaining that
Rash focused mainly on the "use or disposition" clause to the detriment of the "proposed disposition"
clause of section 506(a)), available in WESTLAW, IS-NOV AMBKRIJ 1.
99. See In re Rash, 90 F.3d at 1059 (citing In re Sherman, 157 B.R. 987, 991 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
1993) (supporting the court's interpretation of the "disposition or use")).
100. See id. at 1058. Section 506 stands as a code section applicable to all chapters of bankruptcy,
thus earning the "utility" appellation. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1887
(1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. See In re Rash, 90 F.3d at 1052-55.
102. See id. at 1051.
103. See id.
104. See id.
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The court also rejected the argument that a debtor would reap a windfall in a
foreclosure valuation.'°5 The argument is that a debtor would have property with
a greater retail worth than that which they owe and could subsequently sell the
property at a gain to the detriment to the secured creditor.0 6 The court rejected this
argument on the grounds that in reality a debtor needs the property for the
reorganization plan and a debtor is in no position to recondition, advertise, and sell
the property anyway.' 07
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
The Court, in granting certiorari, did so with the intent to solve a split in the
lower courts.0 8 With the circuits adhering to three separate standards, the Court
necessarily had to evaluate each one. Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the
eight to one majority."
A. Rejection of the Foreclosure Value Standard and the Fifth Circuit's
Reading of Section 506(a)
Justice Ginsburg began the opinion by rejecting the Fifth Circuit's selection
of the foreclosure value standard." 0 The Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the first
sentence of section 506(a) to guide its decision, finding that the "starting point for
valuation [is] what the creditor could realize if it sold the estate's interest in the
property according to the security agreement," specifically by "repossess[ing] and
sell[ing] the collateral.' The Supreme Court majority found the Fifth Circuit's
reliance on the first sentence misplaced because it then rendered moot the second
sentence that purports to tell how to valuate collateral in bankruptcy." 2 Justice
Ginsburg iterated that even when read in isolation, the first sentence of section
506(a) gives no direction as to how to valuate collateral, only a "direction simply
to consider the 'value of such creditor's interest.""'
3
The second sentence of section 506(a), according to the majority, should be
105. See id. at 1054.
106. See id. (citing Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries v. New Bedford Inst. For Sav. (In re Winthrop
Old Farm Nurseries), 50 F.3d 72, 76 (1st Cir. 1995)).
107. See id. But see Robert F. Mitsch and Carleton B. Crutchfield, The Rash Decision: A Question
of Value in Context, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18, 19 (July/Aug. 1997) (observing that debtors reap a
windfall because "it would allow the debtor to have the best of both worlds by keeping the collateral
and paying only what a stranger at a foreclosure sale might pay. Thus the debtor indirectly pays to
himself the money that might have been expended to execute and liquidate the collateral.").
108. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1882 (1997).
109. See id. Justice Stevens was the sole dissenter and Justice Scalia joined the majority in all but
footnote 4 of the opinion. See id. at 1881-82.
110. See id. at 1884.
111. See In re Rash, 90 F.3d at 1044.
112. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1885.
113. See id. at 1884 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
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the focus of collateral valuation because it imparts how "valuation shall be
determined."' 14 Justice Ginsburg stated that the "disposition or use" of the property
provided clearer direction in valuation."' This statutory direction leads the debtor
to certain choices a debtor must face in a bankruptcy proceeding, each pertaining
to the "disposition or use" of collateral which include the following: (1) gain
acceptance of the reorganization plan by the secured creditor; (2) surrender the
collateral to the secured creditor; or (3) keep the collateral by cram down or
acceptance and pay the secured creditor its present value over time." 6 Thus, the
"disposition or use" is determined by the debtor, and consequently, the value of the
collateral is determined by the choice.' If the debtor surrenders the collateral to
the creditor, the debtor has chosen to have the collateral sold off at what most likely
will be a foreclosure or wholesale price."' If the collateral is surrendered the
secured creditor is free to sell it and reinvest its money." 9 Where the debtor
chooses to keep the collateral and cram down the secured creditor, the creditor is
ultimately saying that the collateral is worth as much or more to them than the
foreclosure value that they could get if they were to surrender the collateral to the
creditor. 20 If the foreclosure value standard were applied to the cram down
situation, the debtor's "disposition or use" would be rendered insignificant,
whereas the replacement value standard "distinguishes retention from surrender
and renders meaningful the key words 'disposition or use."""' According to the
Court, neither the creditor, the debtor, nor section 506(a) considers surrender and
retention of the collateral to be "equivalent acts", and thus requires separate
treatment as to "disposition or use."'22 The risks involved in cram down to secured
creditors are much higher than in surrender: a second default is possible as well as
further deterioration of the collateral despite claims to "adequate protection" to
secured creditors offered by section 361. 23 Thus, the actual use for which the
114. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a); Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1885.
115. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1885.
116. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1994); Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1885.
117. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1885. If the debtor gains acceptance for his plan from a creditor, the
secured creditor must, for whatever reason, feel comfortable with the valuation of the collateral received
under the plan or, as a practical matter, the secured creditor would reject the valuation in favor of a
different one. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (stating that a debtor can gain confirmation by acceptance
or cram down).
118. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1885.
119. See id. Note that this is the outcome that ACC sought at the first bankruptcy hearing. See id.
at 1883.
120. See In re Penz, 102 B.R. 826, 828 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989).
121. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1885.
122. See id.
123. See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1994) (requiring secured creditors be adequately protected as to their
interest in property retained by the debtor); Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1885.
debtor is keeping the collateral is determinative, not the hypothetical foreclosure
sale by the secured creditor envisioned by the Fifth Circuit. 24
1. Rejection of any Reference to Legislative History to Support any
Other Reading of Section 506
In footnote four the Court disavowed any authority that legislative history may
hold over the decision of the Court on the valuation issue, stating that "[wie give
no weight to the legislative history of § 506(a), noting that it is unedifying, offering
snippets that might support either standard of valuation." '25 The Court found that
the Senate reports merely restated the code section, the House's use of the term
"replacement cost" had a meaning different from that used by the court on this
issue, and that a House report was taken from discussions before the second
sentence of section 506 was added by the Senate.'26 Thus, the Court dismissed all
the legislative history as insignificant and non-binding on the Court's decision in
finding for a replacement value standard.' 27
B. Rejection of the Mid-Point Standard
While Justice Ginsburg agreed with the admirable goal of simplicity by
providing a rule subject to "predictability and uniformity," she did not agree that
an average of the high and low values offered to the court was the proper
method.'28 Though this standard seemed equitable in its result of a midpoint
between the foreclosure and replacement values, it lacked support in the Bank-
ruptcy Code as written. 2 9 The Court also found that a midpoint standard was in
fact more complex than a replacement value standard because it required two
valuations instead of just one."'
C. Determination of Valuation Must Be Case-by-Case, Yet the Standard
Must Remain the Same
Footnote six hedged the Court's holding for a replacement value standard by
providing that "[w]hether replacement value is the equivalent of retail value,
wholesale value, or some other value will depend on the type of debtor and the
124. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1885-86; cf. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90
F.3d 1036, 1050 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
125. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1886n.4.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 1886.
129. See id.
130. See id.; cf. In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 315-16 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that both debtors and
creditors nearly always have a value they are willing to submit is the value for a given item).
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nature of the property."' 3 ' Further, in footnote five, the Court rejected any standard
of valuation that is without a rule, "allowing use of different valuation standards
based on the facts and circumstances of individual cases."' 32 Thus, the Court
espoused an approach called the "replacement value standard" that purports to take
into account all facts and circumstances and allows courts to determine if
"replacement value" is equivalent to retail, wholesale, foreclosure, or whatever
value the courts find relevant.'33
The Court did not define replacement value beyond "the price a willing buyer
in the debtor's trade, business, or situation would pay to obtain like property from
a willing seller,"' 34 except to give guidelines as to how a valuation might be
modified to correctly state the value of the collateral in the hands of the debtor. '35
The Court found that normal retail value reflects certain costs that must necessarily
be subtracted in order to fairly represent the value; such costs include inventory
storage, reconditioning, warranties, and accessories not covered by the security
agreement.
36
D. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens formulated his dissent based on the majority opinion and
followed the lead set by the Fifth Circuit decision.'37 First, Justice Stevens rebutted
the majority finding that the focal point of section 506(a) is the "proposed
disposition or use" and iterated that the "purpose of the valuation" be the starting
point. 31 Therefore, according to Justice Stevens, the "purpose" clause of the
second sentence can be read independent of the "disposition or use" clause by
finding that the sentence need not be read as necessarily applicable in concert in
every situation. 39 Section 506 is a "utility" section such that the "disposition or
use" clause can apply in many other situations."4 Thus the "disposition or use"
clause is not rendered "surplusage" by its inapplicability in this limited situation as
131. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1886 n.6.
132. See id. at 1886 n.5.
133. See id. at1886 n.6.
134. Id. at 1884.
135. See id. at 1886 n.6.
136. See id. The Court basically addressed one of the Fifth Circuit's problems with a replacement
value standard by providing guidance as to items and services provided by retailers that should not be
counted towards "replacement value." See Associates Commerical Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d
1036, 1051-51 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc), rev'd, 117 S.Ct. 1879 (1997).
137. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1887 (Stevens, J., dissenting); In re Rash, 90 F.3d at 1038-61.
138. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1887 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)).
139. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Unfortunately, Justice Stevens did not cite any examples of
when one clause could clearly apply in place of the other.
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the majority would render it.'4 ' Therefore, the purpose found by Justice Stevens
"is to put the creditor in the same shoes as if he were able to exercise his lien and
foreclose."'42
Justice Stevens also articulated that a standard different than foreclosure value
would shift the economic loss from secured creditors to unsecured creditors by
allowing secured creditors to obtain an advantage in bankruptcy that they would not
enjoy outside of bankruptcy.14 3
E. Analysis of Dissent with Respect to the Majority Opinion
Both the majority and dissent may be correct in the interpretation of the second
sentence of section 506(a) because the sentence can be broken into two parts as
follows: one requiring that the valuation be directed at the "purpose of the
valuation," and the other requiring consideration of the "disposition or use."'" The
whole clause, however, must be taken as two necessary parts that must be
considered together because they are joined by the conjunctive "and." Otherwise,
depending on the collateral and the type of disposition hearing involved, it can
simply be implied that either phrase could be emphasized; 45 thus, "[s]uch value
shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed
disposition or use of such property."'" The dissent, however, focused on the
"and," and believed that although either part of the clause can be emphasized or de-
emphasized, both must still be presently affective.'47 The and connecting the two
clauses ties the two together, and consequently, the phrase must be applied as a
whole directive, including both clauses of the phrase whenever in use under the
Bankruptcy Code.'
141. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The greater a secured creditor's interest in collateral, the less
money there is available to pay unsecured creditors under a reorganization plan.
144. See, e.g., id. at 1884-85 (showing the Court splitting the phrase into two parts); Associates
Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d 1036, 1042-52 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd, 117
S.Ct. 1879 (1997) (same); In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1996) (same).
145. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1885.
146. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1995) (emphasis added).
147. Compare Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1885, with id. at 1887 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (comparing the
majority opinion's failure to distinguish the significance of the word and in the clause versus Justice
Stevens' dissenting opinion which specifically elaborates the effect that the word and has on the clause).
148. See II U.S.C. § 506(a); Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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V. IMPACT
A. Problems with the Court's "Replacement Value Standard": Some of
the Same Questions Still Exist after Rash
While footnote six of the decision may provide lower courts insight into
replacement value, it also takes courts back to square one in the valuation process
because replacement value is dependent upon the purpose of the hearing, the
proposed disposition or use of the property, and "[w]hether replacement value is
the equivalent of retail value, wholesale value, or some other value[] depending on
the type of debtor and the nature of the property."' 49 This ambiguity has led a
number of commentators to question to which situations Rash actually applies. 5 °
Because the Court included in footnote six a list of costs that should be
deducted from an established replacement value, there is a question as to whether
any other costs outside of that list exist. 5 ' A Ninth Circuit panel court in In re
Mulvania reaffirmed In re Taffi 2 by holding that commission costs and hypotheti-
cal sales costs should not be deductible from the replacement value because they
would not accurately reflect the actual use by the debtor.'53 The Rash Court
excluded costs "typically associated with blue book retail valuation including:
warranties, inventory storage and reconditioning."' 54  If the Court used the
reasoning that blue books included these costs, then this raises the question of
whether or not other costs, such as sales, commissions, and advertising costs,
149. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1886 n.6.
150. See, e.g., Bankruptcy-- Valuation: Rash Decision Gets Bad Marksfrom Experts at Bankruptcy
Conference, 66 U.S.L.W. 2207, 2208 (1997) [hereinafter Bankruptcy-Valuation]; Francis Chu,
Industry Applauds Cram-down Ruling, REAL EST. FIN. TODAY, June 20, 1997, at 9; John H. Genovese
& Paul J. Battista, 'Rash' Ruling Should Not Afflict Ch. 11 Valuations, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 13, 1997, at
B12; Norma Hammes, Rash: A Retrospective, (visited Oct. 29, 1997)
<http://nacba.com/cases/rash/rashretr.htm>; Marianne Lavelle, Bankruptcy Ruling Alters Landscape:
'Cram down' Decision May Discourage Liquidations, NAT'L L.J., June 30, 1997, at B1; Alan R.
Ostrowitz, Valuation of Personal Property in Chapter 13 Cram Downs, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 12, 1997, at
1; John J. Rapisardi, Valuing Collateral For Cram Down Purposes, N.Y.L.J., July 24, 1997, at 5.
151. See Gary Klein, Esq., Opinion Raises More Questions than It Answers, 16 AM. BANKR. INST.
J., July/Aug. 1997, at 18; Hammes, supra note 150.
152. Taffi v. United States (In re Taffi), 96 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
153. See Mulvania v. United States (In re Mulvania), 214 B.R. 1, 9-10 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997).
154. Klein, supra note 151, at 18.
should be deducted as well.'55
Another question is raised as to the amount of cost that should be deducted.'56
Costs are hypothetical because the debtor is keeping the collateral. 57 Creditors
before and since Rash dislike these costs because they are hypothetical, and, thus,
subject to much abuse by debtors estimating them extremely high. 5s Even more
questions are raised when the debtor has access to the type of collateral in question
without having to go to a retail seller.159 For example, if the debtor had a brother
who sells new and used trucks and the debtor could buy vehicles for wholesale
prices, then the question is raised whether a court should consider this in valuing
the property in a hypothetical replacement value situation.16 Or, for example, if
the debtor could provide sufficient evidence from newspaper ads or other sources
that like property was sold for less than the replacement cost initiated by the
creditor, then again a question is raised whether a court should also take this into
account. 161
One commentator has suggested another problem: because there is currently
no way to valuate used personal property and the market for used personal property
is limited, there exists a question as to where one should begin a valuation of such
collateral. 62 Presently, there may be inadequate information on items such as the
difference in cost of cars sold with a. warranty from those without, the cost of
reconditioning a used auto prior to resale, the average sales expenses for
commission, or the average marketing expenses for any given vehicle on a lot.'
63
One commentator, however, is confident that with time the industry and courts will
come up with figures and percentages that courts would eventually depend upon
as standards. 64
Where the debtor opts to keep the collateral, creditors face double risks in
155. See id.; see also In re Russell, 211 B.R. 12, 13 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1997) (discussing that when
the National Automobile Dealers Association Guide used to set the replacement value for a car, they
did not "include any extra value for items not retained" by the debtor, including neither warranty costs
nor reconditioning costs).
156. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1883 (1997) (where experts were
required to establish the initial cost of the truck less dealer expenses); BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION,
supra note 22, at 248.
157. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d 1036, 1051 (5th Cir. 1996)
(en banc), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997) ("When hypothetically purchasing a replacement for the
collateral from a retail dealer, the debtor would be buying the replacement property and the services
provided by a dealer, such as inventory storage, reconditioning, marketing, and warranties of quality.")
158. See Mitsch and Crutchfield, supra note 107, at 19.
159. See Robert M. Lawless & Stephen P. Ferris, Economics and the Rhetoric of Valuation, 5 J.
BANKR. L. & PRAc. 3, 18 (1995).
160. See Bankruptcy-Valuation, supra note 150, at 2208.
161. See id. But see In re Russell, 211 B.R. 12, 13 (Bankr. E.D. N. C. 1997) (finding a National
Automobile Dealers Association Guide was be more accurate as to value than prices found by the debtor
in the newspaper).
162. See Bankruptcy-Valuation, supra note 150, at 2208; Klein, supra note 151, at 19.
163. See Klein, supra note 151, at 18.
164. See id.
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Chapter 13 bankruptcy because there is the continued risk of loss from default and
the likely risk of depreciation due to normal wear and tear. 65 A court would have
to take these into consideration when making a replacement value determination
and, in addition, determine to what extent to consider them. 6 6 A court should make
the extent of their allowance based on a value determination "in light of [a
debtor's] 'disposition or use"" 67 and "the nature of the property." '68 The National
Bankruptcy Review Commission, in their analysis of the issue of compensation for
risk of loss, found that the courts and parties are better served when the risk of loss
such as that described by the Court,'6 9 is addressed through "adjustment of the
amortization rate, adjustment of the interest rate, calculation of adequate protection
payments, or changes in other terms of the agreement."' 7 The Commission
reasoned that the costs of risk of loss compensation are more easily quantified and
recognized when out in the open in forms such as those above and not hidden in
a high valuation of collateral.'
7
'
B. Property's "Use and Disposition"
While the Rash Court deferred to the debtor's use of the retained Kenworth
truck, it is possible for a debtor to retain the collateral and yet propose no use. 172
Some would suggest that in situations where the debtor's use cannot be determined,
the fallback position must be the creditor's use, which is generally immediate
foreclosure and sale. 17 This is a solution that would comport with the require-
ments set out in Rash.'74 Although the disposition or use would guide the court's
valuation, it would also strip the creditor of the benefits of the Rash ruling by
defaulting to foreclosure as the valuation standard.'75 Perhaps a better reading of
Rash would require more emphasis in this situation upon the nature of the hearing
165. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1885 (1997) (noting that in a cram
down situation, a creditor is "exposed to double risks: The debtor may again default and the property
may deteriorate from extended use"); Mitsch & Crutchfield, supra note 107, at 19 ("[T]he national
statistics show that over 60 percent of the chapter 13s do not reach discharge").
166. See Rash, 117S. Ct. at 1886 n.6 (the best way to ascertain replacement value is left for the trial
court to determine).
167. See id. at 1886.
168. See id. at 1886 n.6.
169. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
170. BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION, supra note 22, at 258.
171. See id.
172. See Bankruptcy--Valuation, supra note 150, at 2208.
173. See id.
174. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1885-86 (1997).
175. See Bankruptcy--Valuation, supra note 150, at 2208.
involved.176 Thus, the use of a debtor wishing to cram down would be retention
and the Rash replacement value standard would apply.177 Therefore, the debtor's
intention, whether it be stated or unstated, would be irrelevant, and the only
relevant factor would be whether the debtor retains or surrenders the property. 78
C. Effect on Debtor/Creditor Relations
It remains to be seen whether the Rash decision increases or decreases the
amount of litigation generated due to valuation disputes. Litigation may decrease
if parties find that there is at least some certainty in the Rash decision, and if they
can rely on Rash to produce a value within a range narrow enough that the
difference in dispute is not worth litigating.'79 However, there is also the
possibility that parties will decide that the Rash decision did not change anything. 18 0
The perception by parties is that there is as much confusion in the courts as ever."'
Thus, both parties may avoid litigation because it is either too expensive or too
great of a capital risk.'82 Especially in Chapter 13 cases, where the value of
collateral is small anyway, parties will tend to avoid litigation because the costs of
litigation tend to eat up any money saved by a higher or lower valuation. 183
There is also the possibility that litigation will increase because the Rash case
did not really resolve anything, but simply extended the dispute into the foreseeable
future."' In fact, valuation hearings may even be more unclear and expensive due
to all of the costs and issues involved in reaching a replacement value. 85 Not only
must experts establish every cost that a debtor would seek to deduct from the
value,186 but, in addition, they must establish the correct starting value, whether it
be "retail value, wholesale value, or some other value.""8 7 Thus, the issue would
no longer be what standard to use--the Court made it clear that it should be a
176. See id.
177. See Ostrowitz, supra note 150, at 6 ("if the debtor is to continue to utilize the property, the
property will be valued at its replacement value and not its foreclosure value").
178. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1885; Ostrowitz, supra note 150, at 1.
179. See Klein, supra note 151, at 18-19; see also Bankruptcy-Valuation, supra note 150, at 2208.
180. See Rapisardi, supra note 150, at 6.
181. See Bankruptcy-Valuation, supra note 150, at 2208.
182. See Rapisardi, supra note 150, at 5.
183. See In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the problem for debtors and
creditors was that "[rieplacement value cannot be looked up. It must be litigated; and in the process
the value of the asset will be paid out to the lawyers rather than to the creditors"); cf In re Russell, 211
B.R. 12, 12-13 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1997) (discussing a debtor and creditor litigating a valuation issue
over a difference of only $300).
184. See Rapisardi, supra note 150, at 6.
185. See id.; Genovese & Battista, supra note 150, at B12; Stay Litigation after Rash, supra note
24, at 20 ("Undoubtedly, Rash will raise more questions than it answered.").
186. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1886, n.6 (1997). Following the
Court's directive in footnote 6 of the majority opinion, trial courts should look for ways to find a true
replacement value that reflects the actual property the debtor is retaining.
187. See id.
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replacement value standard--but rather the application of that standard.
Other commentators have expressed that the Rash holding will "pressure
debtors to reorganize and run their business as an ongoing concern rather than to
liquidate."' 8 Going concern value is more like replacement value because it values
a business as the sum of its parts rather than by its value if each part were sold off
separately.'l 9 Replacement value then gives "secured parties a bonus--some extra
going concern value[.]"'" Debtors lose leverage in negotiations because they
cannot count on a judge finding a low-ball value of the property under the plan.' 91
One commentator described Rash as a step towards "levelfing] the playing field
with bankrupt debtors."' 92 Thus, debtors will have a harder time cramming down
secured creditors due to the higher foreseeable collateral values that must be met
in reorganization plans. Furthermore, negotiation on other items such as interest
rate, adequate protection, agreement terms, and amortization rate will have to be
at the forefront of a debtor's bankruptcy strategy.' 93
D. Effect on Real Estate Industry
Rash will affect real estate collateral to the extent that a jurisdiction must
determine real estate values starting from a market-based value as a replacement
value instead of starting with a foreclosure value.1 94 The Rash decision, following
the Court's instructions to limit valuation discussion to the actual use by the debtor
and not hypothetical disposition by creditors, will also limit the extent to which a
debtor could convince a court to lower the value of a given property for hypotheti-
cal sales costs and foreclosure. 95 Thus, creditors who are secured by real property
will benefit the most from Rash, while the debtors and unsecured creditors will
suffer the most through failed plan confirmation proposals and less money
available, respectively.
96
188. Lavelle, supra note 150, at BI.
189. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d 1036, 1053 n.23 (5th Cir.
1996)(en banc), rev'd, 117 S.Ct. 1879 (1997).
190. See Bankruptcy-Valuation, supra note 150, at 2207.
191. See In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 316 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that a midpoint Range Rule is
the most fair and simply "split[ing] the difference").
192. Ostrowitz, supra note 150, at 1.
193. See BANKRUPrcy COMMISSION, supra note 22, at 258; Ostrowitz, supra note 150, at 1.
194. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1885-86 (1997).
195. See id.; Chu, supra note 150, at 9. But see Hammes, supra note 150 ("I believe that a valid
argument could be made that brokers fees should be deducted from real property valuation.").
196. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
E. To Which Chapters of Bankruptcy Does Rash Apply?
Section 506(a) is a "utility" section of the Bankruptcy Code, meaning that it
applies to all bankruptcy chapters. '97 Rash will apply not only to Chapter 13 but
to Chapters 7, 11, and 12 as well. 9 ' For example, the Supreme Court in Rash cited
favorably to In re Taffi, a Chapter 11 Ninth Circuit case dealing with valuation
standards.'99 This notation lends credence to the idea that the Court intended Rash
to extend beyond Chapter 13 and to other bankruptcy chapters. 2" Thus, where any
valuations call on section 506(a) to provide guidance in the valuation of collateral,
then Rash will likely apply.
F. Differing Standards for Differing Uses, Hearings, and Collateral
Although Rash calls for value to be determined by the use or disposition of
collateral, there is confusion as to whether value will fluctuate in each situation.20'
Despite the fact that many have declared Rash a victory for creditors or that Rash
is "pro-creditor,"2 2 the fact remains that section 506 applies to many different
situations under the Bankruptcy Code. In each circumstance, debtors and creditors
take opposite stances as to valuation and often flip-flop as to whether they want a
high or a low value.20 3 For example, a secured creditor's first line of action, where
a debtor in bankruptcy is holding collateral which secures the creditor's debt, is to
file a motion to lift the automatic stay under section 362(d)(1).2" In such a
situation, the creditor will want the court to find a low collateral value in order to
show that the debtor either has no equity in the property or, alternately, that the
property is diminishing in value and the debtor cannot adequately protect the
creditor's interest. If the creditor can show either no equity and the property is not
197. See id.; Rapisardi, supra note 150, at 5 ("the precedential effect of this decision cannot be
limited to Chapter 13 cases").
198. See Rapisardi, supra note 150, at 5 ("[the Rash] interpretation of the first two sentences of
Bankruptcy Code § 506(a)-a provision that applies to Chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13").
199. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1883-84, 1884 n.2 (citing In re Taffi, 96 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir.
1996)).
200. See Baxter Dunaway, When the Debtor Retains Property, Is Fair Market or Liquidation Value
Used in a Reorganization Plan?, 6 J. BANKR. L. & PiAc. 617, 624 (Sept./Oct. 1997).
201. See Inter-City Beverage Corp. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Inter-City Beverage
Co., Inc.), 209 B.R. 931, 933 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997) (determining the value of collateral using
replacement value where the purpose and disposition was a distressed sale); Stay Litigation After Rash,
supra note 24 (asserting that courts have been confused since Rash).
202. See, e.g., Ostrowitz, supra note 150, at 1.
203. See Stay Litigation after Rash, supra note 24, at 15 ("[lIt sure seems arguable to us that in
a motion to lift the stay, the last clause of § 506(a) dictates a different type of
valuation in stay litigation than in plan confirmation litigation"). See generally, J. Queenan, Jr.,
Standards For Valuation of Security Interests in Chapter 11, 92 CoMM. L.J. 18 (1987) (discussing
litigant strategies in bankruptcy).
204. See Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 7, at 1070.
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required for a successful reorganization or that there is a lack of adequate
protection of the creditor's interest, then the creditor may have the stay lifted as to
that property and can foreclose. If the creditor loses this battle, then the next line
of action is for the debtor to defend against a cram down by arguing that the value
of the property is high--at least higher than the debt. However, parties run the risk
of quickly losing favor with a court if they try to flip from low to high value as it
seems to suit them."0 5 Yet section 506 and Rash seem to advocate just such a
scenario, where a property is valued depending on the use and/or the purpose of the
valuation.2°6
G. Confusion in the Courts as to Rash
Several courts have interpreted Rash to mean either more or less than what
seems to be its plain meaning. In In re Inter-City Beverage Co., Inc.,2"7 the
bankruptcy court misapplied Rash in a Chapter 11 case involving a bulk distressed
sale of the collateral before the court.0 8 The Inter-City Beverage court held that
the creditor, GMAC, was allowed a secured claim of the replacement value of their
collateral that had been sold at a distressed sale.2"9 The court simply reasoned that
Rash applied even though this was not a cram down situation." ° This outcome
seems clearly contrary to Rash, where the Supreme Court envisioned the retention
of other valuation standards in situations other than where the debtor retains the
collateral and attempts to cram down the secured claimant."' The Inter-City
Beverage court failed to apply the test required by Rash. 2  GMAC should have
been limited to the liquidation value of the collateral that the distressed sale
brought, because the purpose of the valuation and the "disposition or use" by the
parties was the liquidation of assets in order to pay off creditors like GMAC.
213
In In re Gates,"1 4 the debtor kept a car under a Chapter 13 reorganization plan
and attempted to cram down her secured creditor.2 5 The debtor first claimed that
the proper starting value should be taken from a price guide which listed the trade-
205. See Stay Litigation after Rash, supra note 24.
206. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1885-86 (1997).
207. Inter-City Beverage Corp. v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Inter-City Beverage Corp.),
209 B.R. 931 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997).
208. See id. at 933.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1885.
212. See id.; see also Genovese & Battista, supra note 150, at Bi2.
213. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1885.
214. 214 B.R. 467 (Bankr. D. Md. 1997).
215. See id. at 468-69.
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in or wholesale price of vehicles.216 The debtor claimed that where the creditor
only offered a retail value, based on a National Automobile Dealers Association
Official Used Car Guide (N.A.D.A. Guide),217 without removing the cost items
required to be subtracted by Rash in footnote six, then the appropriate value should
be determined using the trade-in or wholesale value."' In a memorandum opinion,
the bankruptcy court held that in the case of personal consumer use of collateral,
retail value was the appropriate starting value and, furthermore, it was incumbent
upon the debtor to provide proof of items of reduction to that value.2"9 The Rash
decision indicated that certain items should not be included in replacement value.22°
However, the Gates decision appears to be in harmony with Rash where the
"bankruptcy courts, as triers of fact," are to identify "the best way of ascertaining
replacement value on the basis of the evidence presented."22' Thus, the Gates court
found who wanted the costs deducted was the same party who needed to present
the evidence of costs.
222
In re Russell2 3 is a good case to exemplify what the Supreme Court seemed
to have intended to be a result of the Rash decision. The facts of Russell are
similar to Rash: a Chapter 13 debtor tried to cram down his secured creditor on a
car that he was keeping under his reorganization plan.224 The secured creditor
provided evidence from a N.A.D.A. Guide establishing the car's value, whereas the
debtor provided evidence from a newspaper showing that the car was selling for
$300 less than the guide. 225 The court held that the N.A.D.A. Guide provided a
better starting valuation than the newspaper ad, where the debtor could provide no
evidence that the vehicle in the ad was "of like age and condition ' 26 to the debtor's
car. 227 The court agreed with the debtor, though, that the costs specified by
footnote six of the Rash opinion should be deducted from the N.A.D.A. Guide, had
the guide included them. 22 However, the court specifically rejected the debtor's
argument for deducting retail costs as "inconsistent with the specific holding in
Rash," that replacement value reflect "the cost the debtor would incur to obtain a
like asset for the same 'proposed ... use.', 229 The court also reasoned that
deducting retail costs was further inconsistent with Rash's adherence to the
216. See id. at 469.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 469-70.
219. See id. at 471.
220. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1886 n.6 (1997).
221. See In re Gates, 214 B.R. at 471.
222. See id. at 472.
223. 211 B.R. 12 (Bankr. E.D.N.C 1997).
224. See id. at 12.
225. See id.
226. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1884 n.2 (1997).
227. See In re Russell, 211 B.R. at 13.
228. See id. (citing Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1886 n.6).
229. See id. at 14 (quoting Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1886).
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Seventh Circuit's desire that "a simple rule of valuation [was] needed."23 ° Finally,
the court rejected the debtor's argument against Rash's favorable citation to In re
Taffi,231 which held that hypothetical sales costs should not be deducted from the
collateral's value.232
H. Wholesale Value as Possible Solutions as Suggested by the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission to Congress
Shortly after the Supreme Court handed down Rash, the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission reviewed the Rash opinion and gave its own evaluation and
solution of the valuation problem to Congress.233
The Commission proposed wholesale value as a compromise between the often
high values represented by retail and the low values obtained at foreclosure or
liquidation.234 The Commission believed that this valuation standard could produce
a cheaper, more efficient standard for courts to rely on than the replacement value
standard offered by the Rash court or even than the equitable split-the-difference
value standard.235
Wholesale value is the value set by a guide, such as the N.A.D.A. Guide for
motor vehicles or the value that dealers or markets in the goods puts on the
property, depending on whether the good is used or new.236 In Chapter 13
bankruptcies, most goods are personal and used and should be priced as such
without reference to new goods' prices containing warranties and sales costs. 237
Wholesale value portends to be simple, requiring only one valuation, unlike an
average which requires at least two.
238
230. See id. at 14 n.3 (quoting Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1886).
231. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1883-84, 1884 n.2.
232. See In re Russell, 211 B.R. at 14 (citing Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1884 n.2); see also Hammes,
supra note 150 ("the profit associated with a vehicle's 'retail value' [sh]ould also be disallowed").
233. See BANKRUPTcY COMMISSION, supra note 22, at 243.
234. See id. at 250.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 251; see also In re Russell, 211 B.R. at 14 ("[Tlhe starting point for [I evaluation
will be N.A.D.A. retail value."). Judge Easterbrook noted, in referring to N.A.D.A. Guides, that
"[w]holesale and retail values can be looked up in tables. They are simple to administer and satisfy my
test or a good rule." In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 320 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
237. See BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION, supra note 22, at 251.
238. See id. at 253.
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I. Midpoint Value as Valid Alternative
The Rash Court easily dismissed any midpoint standard as unsupported by
section 506(a).239 However, a midpoint standard would provide a compromise
position that could be easily established despite requiring at least two valuations.24
Parties who dispute the value of property in bankruptcy inevitably have at least two
values already or there would not be a dispute.241 Parties in negotiation tend to
shift to a middle ground somewhere between what each claims to be the proper
value of the collateral. u2
While a midpoint standard still requires two valuations to be made and
submitted, it does provide a clear point for parties to rely on in negotiations outside
of court.243 A midpoint value standard would also help to eliminate litigation on
the issue of value because any discrepancies on either end of the spectrum (retail
vs. foreclosure) would only marginally affect the midpoint.2" This manner of
valuation also encourages negotiation between the parties to work out the midpoint
without having to go to the trouble of having expensive valuations performed and
testified to by professional experts, only to have them averaged by the court.245
Parties are encouraged to find a middle ground on their own. However, the Court
specifically rejected this standard of valuation, thus making it inaccessible to all but
Congress.' 6
239. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1886 (1997).
240. See In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d at 316.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 315.
243. See id. at 316.
244. See id. For example, if there is $1,000 in dispute between the parties' valuation figures, then
the midpoint would settle for the middle. Under a midpoint standard the parties have nothing to litigate
except maybe the veracity of the values they allege. Yet, even that issue is weakened because the most
the parties can gain is half of whatever difference in value between the actual replacement/foreclosure
value and the asserted one. However, if either the foreclosure or replacement standard is the accepted
standard, then the parties are litigating the full difference between foreclosure and replacement value.
Taking the above example, if X were to allege $100 more (or Y were to allege $100 less) value than
what is in actuality, then the amount in dispute would raise to $1,100. Under a midpoint value
standard, the raised amount at issue is only $50 more, not $100, thus less reason to litigate. Whereas
under any other sort of valuation, the difference is the full $550. Not only that, but one side or the other
tends to lose more due to a valuation standard to one extreme or the other, thus parties would be more
apt to litigate a higher value issue.
245. See In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d at 315.
246. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1886 (1997).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Rash, the Supreme Court gave clear direction that the valuation standard is
the replacement value standard and that the purpose of the valuation and the
proposed disposition or use are the focal point in deciding what valuation is
appropriate.247 However, courts must still struggle with the valuation question due
to the number of different purposes, 48 directives in Rash,249 and uses of property
in bankruptcy no matter how one looks at the Rash decision.25 ° Where parties
cannot or will not negotiate a compromise valuation of the collateral, the
bankruptcy courts will determine the value based on these criteria, whether it be to
the benefit of the secured creditor, the unsecured creditor, or the debtor.
KENNETH L. REICH
247. See id.
248. See Stay Litigation after Rash, supra note 24.
249. See Rash, 117 S. CT. at 1886 n.6.
250. See Bankruptcy--Valuation, supra note 150, at 2207.

